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A centralfeature of the reforms enacted through the PersonalResponsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (welfare reform) has been
the adoption of strategies to involuntarily remove Temporary Assistance
to Needy Families (TANF) recipients from the welfare rolls, including
increased use of sanctions and time limits on welfare receipt. Drawing
on data from a three year panel study of women who had been receiving
welfare in a state which adopted stringent sanctioning and time limit
policies, we investigate predictors of recipients' TANF status after implementation of welfare reform, and identify differences in post-reform
material resources, hardships and quality of life based on TANF status.
Almost half of all welfare case closures during the first time period after
reforms were implemented through involuntary strategies. Relatively few
baseline characteristics predicted different outcomes once welfare time
limits and sanctions were implemented. Those who were timed off welfare
had substantiallylower incomes in the year following their removal. One
third of all respondents, regardless of reason for leaving TANF reported
having insufficient food, housing problems and lack of access to needed
medical care.
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The passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA, 1996) revamped federal
welfare efforts to emphasize participation in the labor force as a
primary strategy for reducing the dependence of single mothers
and their children on public assistance. To amplify the consequences for failing to comply with new program requirements,
Congress passed a mandatory time limit of 60 months for receipt
of Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), and allowed
states the option of imposing stricter sanctions on families that
were not following through on mandated activities. As a result,
states now have greater latitude to involuntarily remove TANF
families from the welfare rolls, without regard to their social or
economic circumstances.
Research on welfare caseloads has largely focused on identifying differences between welfare "leavers" and "stayers," but
these studies have not differentiated between those who leave
TANF voluntarily because they have obtained other income, and
those who are removed from TANF involuntarily, either through
time limits or sanctions. Descriptive information about the characteristics of sanctioned families suggests that they may possess
certain demographic or human capital characteristics that may
make them more vulnerable to involuntary removal. However,
longitudinal research on this topic is limited. Even fewer studies
have examined the longitudinal impact of involuntary leaving for
TANF families' material resources, hardships, and quality of life.
Drawing on data from a three-year panel study of women
who had been receiving welfare in Louisiana, a state that has
adopted stringent sanctioning and time limit policies, we address
the following questions:
1. What is the TANF status of study participants once welfare
reform rules, including time limits and increased sanctions,
have been implemented?
2. What baseline characteristics are predictive of later TANF status?
3. Are there differences in subsequent financial resources, hardships, and quality of life measures based on earlier TANF
status?
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Background
PRWORA replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), a means-tested public assistance program created
through the Social Security Act of 1935 to provide financial assistance to impoverished single mothers with children (Gordon,
1994). A central feature of the reforms enacted through PRWORA
has been the adoption of strategies to involuntarily remove TANF
recipients from the welfare rolls. These strategies were designed
to serve both as an anticipatory incentive to engage in work efforts
and as a punishment for non-compliance with welfare regulations
(Corcoran, Danziger, Kalil & Seefeldt, 2000; Ferber & Storch, 1998).
The most prominent of these efforts has been the creation of time
limits and the imposition of stricter sanctions for women deemed
to be non-compliant with various welfare rules.
Sanctions and Time Limits Policies

The federal government has devolved responsibility for developing welfare policy to the states, and as a result states vary
widely in their applications of time limits and sanctions. Sanctions impose financial penalties on clients for failing to comply
with administrative rules such as participating in mandatory
work activities, pursuing child support enforcement, obtaining
immunizations for children and providing required paperwork.
Although time limits have received increased public attention
as a new element introduced by PRWORA, more families are
affected by sanctions than time limits; by one estimate, almost four
times as many families will experience sanctions as time limits
(Bloom & Winstead, 2002). Estimates of sanction rates range from
5 percent to 52 percent depending on the sampling methodology
used (Pavetti, 2003).
Prior to 1996, many states were experimenting with reforms
that were incorporated into PRWORA, including the use of a
full family sanction, which allows the welfare agency to terminate benefits to an entire family for non-compliance. Under
AFDC, when a parent was non-compliant with work activities,
their portion of the public assistance grant was withheld, but
the children's portion continued to be paid (Ferber & Storch,
1998). As of 2001, 36 states impose full family sanctions at some
point in the process of deeming a client to be non-compliant, and
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eighteen of these states terminate all benefits immediately upon
any instance of non-compliance (Center for Law and Social Policy,
2001). In seven states, noncompliance with work activities can
lead to lifetime ineligibility for TANF benefits (Bloom & Winstead,
2002).
Under PRWORA rules, states are prohibited from using TANF
dollars to provide cash assistance to families for longer than
60 months. States are free to continue to provide assistance to
clients using their own resources after the 60 months have been
surpassed, and ten states do so, including New York and California which comprise a significant portion of the nation's welfare
caseload (Bloom, Farrell, Fink & Adams-Ciardullo, 2002). States
also have the option of imposing shorter time limits than the
federal maximum, which 17 states have opted to do (Bloom,
Farrell, Fink & Adams-Ciardullo, 2002), the shortest time limit
being found in Tennessee, which ends welfare payments after
one year (Kim, 2000). As of 2002, 93,000 families have had their
case closed because of time limits (Bloom, Farrell, Fink & AdamsCiardullo, 2002).
Correlatesand Outcomes for Involuntary Leavers
A handful of studies have identified correlates of sanctioning,
but fewer have looked at which families are involuntarily removed from welfare because of time limits. Most studies note that
mothers are more likely to be sanctioned if they have lower educational levels (Edeloch, Liu & Martin, 2000; Goldberg & Schott,
2000; Hasenfeld, Ghose & Larson, 2004; Kalil, Seefeldt & Wang,
2002; Westra, 2000). Contrasting findings are noted regarding age,
with some finding that younger women are more likely to be
sanctioned (Hasenfeld, Ghose & Larson, 2004; Kalil, Seefeldt &
Wang, 2002) and others finding that sanctioned leavers are older
(Lindhorst, Mancoske & Kemp, 2000). In some studies, being
sanctioned is also associated with race and disability with African
Americans more likely to be sanctioned (Hasenfeld, Ghose &
Larson, 2004; Kalil, Seefeldt & Wang, 2002), and those who are
disabled having a greater likelihood of sanctioning (Hasenfeld,
Ghose & Larson, 2004).
Federal law does not require that states assess the impact of
sanctions or time limits on families. As a result, only a handful of
studies are available that investigate outcomes, and these tend to
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focus on reported income and employment. The purpose of sanctioning is to increase women's compliance with work mandates,
yet, whether sanctioning acts as an incentive to employment is
unclear. Survey research with welfare recipients indicates that
sanctioned leavers have lower employment rates than other welfare leavers (Lee, Slack & Lewis, 2004; Moffitt & Roff, 2000); however, when using administrative data to compare state policies
and rates of work among recipients, Kim (2000) found that the
probability of working is higher for recipients who live in states
that employ a full family sanction for non-compliance. It is also
unclear whether material hardship differs among sanctioned and
voluntary leavers. In some studies, being sanctioned is associated
with greater risk of having utilities turned off (Kalil, Seefeldt &
Wang, 2002; Lee, Slack & Lewis, 2004; Lindhorst, Mancoske &
Kemp, 2000), experiencing food insecurity (Cherlin et al, 2001;
Lee, Slack & Lewis, 2004; Lindhorst, Mancoske & Kemp, 2000)
and having unmet medical needs (Lindhorst, Mancoske & Kemp,
2000). Other studies, though, have found that these hardships are
common for all welfare leavers regardless of the reason they left
(Bloom & Winstead, 2002).
Similarly, those who left welfare because of time limits also do
not appear to have significantly higher levels of material hardship
relative to voluntary leavers (Bloom, Farrell, Fink & AdamsCiardullo, 2002). Time limits do not appear to have succeeded
in encouraging work among recipients post-PRWORA (Bloom,
Farrell, Fink & Adams-Ciardullo, 2002; Kim, 2000), likely because
those who are more employable leave before time limits are
imposed.
Background on Welfare Reform in Louisiana

Louisiana has a historically high level of poverty and welfare
use. In 2000, Louisiana had the highest percentage of children in
single mother families living below the poverty line (50 percent),
and was 4 8 th out of 50 states for the percentage of children living
in poverty (30 percent). Louisiana is second to last among the
states in the percentage of children whose parents do not have
full-time, year round employment. Given these facts, it is not
surprising that Louisiana has one of the highest percentages of
children living in high risk environments in the country (Annie E.
Casey Foundation, 2000).
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Welfare reform was instituted in Louisiana through the creation of the Family Independence Temporary Assistance Program
(FITAP). Recipients are required to spend 20 hours per week in
approved work activities, except for women with children under
one year of age. Louisiana elected to implement the Family Violence Option, which allows states to grant a temporary waiver
of these program requirements to any person who is a verified
victim of domestic violence. Louisiana is one of a handful of states
that has opted to impose both full family sanctions, as well as a
shorter time limit, timing recipients off welfare after 24 months
of benefits (as compared to the five-year maximum required by
Congress). Families must wait two years before reapplying after
they have exceeded the limit (Louisiana Department of Social
Services [LaDSS], 2003). While Louisiana had already imposed
sanctions of the loss of individual benefits for any household head
who failed to obtain work or work training within three months,
beginning March 1, 1998, the whole family could be terminated
from benefits (LaDSS, 1998b).
Since 1993, the welfare caseload has decreased 72.7 percent in
Louisiana, placing it well above the national mean of 56 percent
in its rate of reduction (U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services [US DHHS], 2004). In 1999, when the first wave of recipients reached the 24-month time limit in the state, approximately
4,200 people stopped receiving welfare benefits (DeParle, 1999).
Temporary exemptions from termination were given to another
2,000 people, mainly because of physical health problems of the
mother, or her care for a disabled child (Finch, 1999). The state did
not record any exemptions for reasons of domestic violence in the
first wave of time limits. In the year after time limits were enacted
(the second year of the present study), the welfare caseload in the
state declined by 48 percent (US DHHS, 2004). Louisiana is one of
five states which account for the largest number of families timed
off welfare (Bloom, Farrell, Fink & Adams-Ciardullo, 2002).
Methods
From 1998 through 2001, a panel study of welfare recipients
was conducted to evaluate outcomes related to implementation of
PRWORA in Louisiana (McElveen, Mancoske & Lindhorst, 2000).
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To create the panel, a random sample, stratified to represent the
rural and urban distribution of the state's welfare caseload, was
created from a recipient listing provided by the state Department
of Social Services (LaDSS). Subjects were eligible for participation
if they were 18 years or older and receiving welfare payments as
the guardian of a dependent child during the first year of the
study in 1998. Child-only cases in which welfare payments did
not include the adult recipient were excluded from the panel,
as these cases were exempted from many of the new PRWORA
regulations. Respondents were enrolled in the panel study prior
to the implementation of time limits and other increased sanctions
which were initiated in Louisiana in January 1999. In year one,
a response rate of 72 percent was attained. At each wave of data
collection, in-person interviews were completed by either a social
worker or a Master's in Social Work student, and respondents
were given small financial incentives for participation.
In the second year, 348 respondents were resurveyed, representing 61.1 percent of the original sample. In reports from
federally funded studies of welfare leavers, re-interview response
rates vary from 51 to 75 percent (Isaacs & Lyon, 2000), indicating
that the response rate for this panel study is consistent with
other longitudinal studies of welfare recipients. Higher attrition
rates are not unusual in longitudinal research within low-income
communities where mobility is high and access to telephones
can be sporadic (Katz, E1-Mohandes, Johnson, Jarrett, Rose, &
Cober, 2001). For the first set of analyses, we use data for the 348
women who were interviewed in year one and year two, using
first year responses to construct predictors of welfare status in
year two. For the second analyses, we use data for 277 women for
whom responses from all three years are available to investigate
consequences of involuntary welfare leaving.
Measurement

The dependent variable of TANF Status was determined by
the client's self-report, first of whether they were currently receiving TANF payments, and if not, the primary reason that they
were no longer receiving TANE Based on a list of case closure
statuses provided by the LaDSS and interviewee responses, 3
additional categories were created. Voluntary leavers consisted
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of those persons who were dropped from the welfare rolls because they had received other income through work or marriage,
who were no longer eligible because the child turned 18 or no
longer lived with the respondent, or who voluntarily chose not to
reapply for benefits. Timed off leavers were those who reported
reaching the 24 month time limit and having their benefits ended.
Sanctioned leavers included respondents who were involuntarily
removed from the rolls because they did not meet the work
requirements, did not cooperate with child support, missed an
appointment, didn't know why their benefits ended, or believed
the welfare office had made a mistake.
Human capital characteristics:To assess potential barriers to
work and reasons for continued welfare use, we measured eight
areas associated with these outcomes in previous studies. Education was a dichotomous measure of whether the respondent
graduated from high school/obtained a Graduate Equivalency
Diploma (GED) or not (0 = no; 1 = yes). Respondents were asked
whether they had ever married (0 = never married; 1 = ever married); and whether they were currently employed, defined as selfreport of any paid work outside the home, either full-time or
part-time of at least 20 hours per week (0 = not employed; 1 =
employed). Mothers were asked whether they or any child they
cared for were currently disabled (0 = no disability; 1 = disabled).
Measurement of domestic violence used the Epidemiological Survey of Intimate Partner Violence designed by the Louisiana Office of Public Health (Kohn, Flood, Chase & McMahon, 2000).
Two screening questions asked respondents if they experienced
physical violence (defined as having been hit, slapped, kicked,
punched or beaten) or harassment (defined as being stalked or
threatened with violence by someone known to the victim) in
the past year. Two measures of longer-term poverty spells were
also used. Recent poverty measures the proportion of time that a
respondent reported she had received TANF in the previous five
years (range = 0-5). Childhood poverty was measured by a proxy
variable asking the respondent if, during her childhood, either
parent had ever received welfare payments.
Results of leaving:To investigate possible outcomes of differing
welfare statuses, we assess associations between TANF status and
three areas in the third year: available resources, material hard-
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ships, and quality-of-life experiences. Available financialresourceis
a proxy for income that measures the total monthly amount the
respondent reported receiving from any of the following sources:
employment, TANF payments, Food Stamps, child support, or
other financial resources such as Supplemental Security Income,
Social Security Disability payments, etc. We also assess current
employment as noted above, and the percentage of people that
receive Food Stamps. We also measured resource limitations in
the areas of food, housing and health in the past 3 months. Insufficient food is measured as the percentage of respondents who
answered "yes" to any of three questions about food insecurity:
went without food for a day or more because there wasn't any
money; had to go to a food bank or a soup kitchen; or had to skip
meals or eat less because there wasn't enough money (Carlson,
Andrews, and Bickel, 1999). Housing problems were measured as
the percentage of respondents who answered "yes" to any of six
questions that asked whether in the past 3 months, the respondent
had been unable to pay her rent, had been without any shelter, had
the electricity turned off, had to move in with others, have others
move in to help cover expenses, or had the phone turned off.
Health hardshipswere defined as the percentage of people needing,
but not receiving Medicaid, and being unable to obtain needed
medical care for themselves or their children.
We also measured areas related to quality of life in the third
year. A measure of health from the Health-Related Quality-of-Life
Measure (Newschaffer, 1998) was used to assess general health
status, where respondents noted the number of days in the past
30 days in which they were in poor health. Mental health was
measured using the Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression scale (CES-D, Radloff, 1977). The CES-D is a self-report scale
of depressive symptomotology widely used to identify possible
depression in research samples. We categorized each respondent
as one who would likely meet clinical criteria for a diagnosis of
major depression if their score exceeded 22 on the scale (Measurement Excellence and Training Resource Information Center,
2004). In addition, we measured the lifetime incidence of domestic
violence and sexual assault(0 = no violence; 1 = violence) in the third
year using a modified version of the Louisiana epidemiological
survey mentioned above. Since these questions assess lifetime
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prevalence rather than incidence post-sanctioning, they should
be interpreted as associations with TANF status rather than as
consequences.
Data Analysis
The first research question regarding TANF status was analyzed using descriptive statistics. In order to evaluate the second
research question related to predictors of TANF status, a multinomial logistic regression equation was constructed since TANF status is composed of four non-orderable categories (Demaris, 1992).
In this analysis, the status of remaining on TANF is compared to
each of the three leaver statuses: leaving voluntarily, being timed
off welfare, or being sanctioned. We present the odds ratio for
each predictor variable which can be interpreted as the change
in odds (greater than I = increased odds; less than 1 - decreased
odds) of being in one of the leaver categories relative to those
remaining on TANE Overall model fit is evaluated using the -2
log likelihood test (Pedhazur, 1997). The pseudo R2 describes the
proportion of variance explained by the independent variables,
and its interpretation is similar to that of the R2 in OLS regression.
Both figures are reported at the end of the tables. The second research question regarding outcomes associated with TANF status
is assessed using one way Analysis of Variance, with the post-hoc
Bonferroni test (Castaneda, Levin & Dunham, 1993).
Results
Description of sample
Approximately 90 percent of the sample was African American, consistent with the demographics of the LaDSS caseload
(LaDSS, 1998a). Just over half (53 percent) had received a high
school diploma or GED, and 36.5 percent had been married at
some point in their lives. Average age of respondents was 34.5
(SD = 12.28) at the start of the study, and they had 2.5 (SD=1.48)
children on average, with 48.4 percent having a child under the
age of five. One fifth of the respondents were either disabled themselves (19.4 percent) or caring for a disabled child (19.8 percent).
Eight percent reported experiencing serious physical violence
or harassment in the previous year. Almost eighty percent had
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received TANF payments for more than a year in the past five
years (recent poverty), but only 33.2 percent had parents who
received welfare payments when the respondent was a child.
Thirty percent of recipients were working in the first year.
TANF status in the year after implementation of welfare reform
After enactment of sanctioning and time limit policies, 38.3
percent of respondents continued to receive TANF, 33.0 percent
had left welfare voluntarily, 12.5 percent were timed off, and 16.2
percent were sanctioned off welfare for other reasons. Using the
62 percent (n = 213) whose TANF ended in the second year as the
whole, 54 percent left TANF for voluntary reasons, usually because they obtained employment (29.7 percent) and their work income made them ineligible for benefits, or because they received
other income (14.4 percent), most frequently SSI or Social Security
Disability payments. Over 45 percent of the respondents had their
TANF benefits discontinued involuntarily, with the majority of
these (21.8%) being because the mother had reached the twentyfour month time limit imposed in 1999. Families experienced full
family sanctions for not meeting work requirements (7.9 percent),
missing appointments (4.5 percent) or not assisting with child
support enforcement (1.9 percent). Although the welfare office
noted that cases could be closed if children were not immunized,
didn't meet school attendance requirements, or if the parent was
no longer eligible because of citizenship status, no respondent
reported these as primary reasons for their involuntary removal.
Factors predicting TANF status
The next analysis assesses the role of demographic and human capital variables in predicting the likelihood of achieving a
particular TANF status. Odds ratios are presented for the statuses
of "Voluntary leaver," "Timed off," and "Sanctioned" relative to
those still on TANF (see Table 1).
Overall, relatively few characteristics differentiated any of the
leaver statuses from those who remained on TANE Voluntary
leavers differed from those who remained on TANF in that they
were less likely to have children under 5 years of age (OR = .55)
and were more likely to have been working at baseline (OR =
3.24). Those who were timed off TANF were also less likely to
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have young children (OR = .52), were more likely to be working
at baseline (OR = 3.15) and were less likely to have a disabled
child (OR=.23). Respondents who were sanctioned off TANF were
not significantly different from those remaining on TANF on
any of the characteristics. The overall model is significant on the
goodness-of-fit X2, with the full model explaining approximately
eight percent of the variance in TANF status.
Effects of TANF Status on Later Outcomes
Differences between TANF statuses exist in fewer than half of
the categories related to resources, material hardships and overall
health and mental health, indicating that the groups are more
alike than different. Significant differences appear in financial
resources, receipt of Food Stamps, and medical care hardships.
Monthly financial resources differ significantly across the four
groups. Timed off leavers have the lowest monthly financial resources of the four groups, even though a sizeable proportion
is working. Recipients were working in all groups, with voluntary leavers reporting the highest work level of 50 percent.
Declining Food Stamps use among voluntary leavers who are
working might be anticipated since increased income limits Food
Stamps eligibility. However, given that the incomes of voluntary
leavers are lower than TANF recipients the likelihood is that many
of these families remain eligible for Food Stamp participation,
whether they receive Food Stamps or not.
Material hardships differ among the three groups in two
categories related to medical resources. Twenty-nine percent of
timed off leavers and almost one quarter of the voluntary leavers
were unable to obtain medical care that they needed, a significant
difference when compared to those continuing to receive TANE
Almost three times as many of the voluntary, timed off and
sanctioned leavers reported that they needed Medicaid, but were
unable to obtain it. Markedly smaller percentages reported that
they were unable to access needed medical care for a child, likely
reflecting the availability of special child insurance programs.
Almost one-third of the families across all TANF statuses reported
food insecurity, but the differences between the groups were
not significant. Thirty-one to 44.4 percent of respondents also
reported serious housing problems, such as not being able to pay

Welfare Sanctions and Time Limits

105

Table 1

Odds Ratios (StandardErrors)fromMultinomial LogisticalRegression
Analysis PredictingTANF Status§.
Voluntary leavers Timed off
Sanctioned
vs. on TANF
vs. on TANF vs. on TANF
Demographics
Age
African American
Children less than 5 years
Rural residence

.97
(.02)
1.23
(.58)
.55***
(.12)
1.37
(.51)

.98
(.02)
1.87
(1.35)
.52*
(.15)
.53
(.32)

.98
(.02)
1.76
(1.22)
.68
(.17)
1.05
(.51)

1.44
(.42)
3.24***
(1.10)
1.35

1.14
(.46)
3.15**
(1.37)
1.44

1.20
(.45)
.76
(.38)
1.14

(.47)

(.67)

(.51)

.62
(.25)
.69
(.25)
.77
(.43)
.87
(.08)
1.13
(.38)

.33
(.23)
.23*
(.16)
.63
(.53)
.97
(.12)
1.37
(.62)

.42
(.22)
.74
(.33)
.96
(.62)
1.11
(.13)
1.11
(.13)

Human CapitalVariables
Graduated high school
Currently employed
Ever married
Disabled recipient
Disabled child
Current domestic violence
Recent poverty
Childhood poverty
-2 log likelihood

Pseudo R2

-360.57**

.08
§Comparison group is those who remaining on TANF
*p =.05, **p =.01, ***p =.001.
2
X (36, n = 309) = 65.85, p < 01.
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rent, or having the electricity or phone disconnected, but again,
TANF status was not associated with these hardships.
TANF status approaches significance in its association with
having ever experienced domestic violence. Almost twice as
many timed off and sanctioned leavers reporting having ever
experienced domestic violence in their lifetime as compared to
voluntary leavers. When these two groups are collapsed into "involuntary leavers," they report significantly higher levels of domestic violence than do voluntary leavers (F=3.74, p<.05). While
no significant differences were found between the TANF status
groups in regards to their report of health or their level of depression, between 31 and 42 percent of the women endorse feelings
consistent with a diagnosis of major depression. A relatively
high number of women across each status also reported having
experienced sexual assault in their lifetime, particularly among
those still receiving TANF benefits.
Discussion
In this study, almost half of respondents noted that their cases
were closed for involuntary reasons, contradicting the general
public's view that women leave welfare because they find work
(DeParle, 2004). Despite the emphasis in welfare reform policies
on helping families to achieve economic self-sufficiency through
work, less than one third of case closures in this study were as a
result of achieving employment, and the majority of involuntary
leavers were not working. Louisiana has been successful in implementing time limits, as this accounts for the highest percentage of
involuntary leavers. These findings underscore econometric data
indicating that time limit policies in particular are responsible for
a significant portion of the decrease in welfare caseloads since
their implementation (Grogger 2002; Fang & Keane, 2004).
A minority of the welfare leavers in this survey (29.7 percent)
actually exited welfare because they had obtained employment.
During the last year of the survey, 50 percent of the voluntary
leavers, 45 percent of the sanctioned leavers, 35 percent of TANF
recipients, and 33 percent of those timed off welfare were working. If increased sanctions and time limits were acting as an
incentive to work, one would expect to see higher rates of em-
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ployment among involuntary leavers, given their lack of access to
public financial assistance. Since a minority of women who have
been sanctioned or timed off welfare were working, the policies
do not appear to be successful in significantly increasing work
force participation. This is consistent with earlier findings that
sanctions and time limits do not act as significant incentives to
improve employment outcomes (Moffitt & Roff, 2000; Pavetti,
2003).
Perhaps the most striking in these analyses are the similarities
among TANF recipients, voluntary leavers and those timed or
sanctioned off welfare. Very few demographic or human capital
characteristics differentiated these groups. Voluntary leavers and
those who were timed off welfare had similar baseline characteristics, as did respondents who remained on TANF or who
reported being sanctioned off. These findings suggest that other
structural rather than individual factors may be more relevant
to understanding why some people leave via sanctions and time
limits and some are able to obtain employment, gain other income
or leave for other voluntary reasons.
Regardless of TANF status, a significant number of respondents reported serious material hardships such as having insufficient food, serious housing problems or an inability to obtain
necessary medical care for the recipient (but not the child). It appears that even families leaving voluntarily left for situations that
did not substantially improve their family's social or economic
circumstances. Although differences between leavers and TANF
recipients were not seen in their reports of food and housing
hardships, one third of respondents reported these problems,
with timed off and sanctioned leavers reporting the highest levels. Other studies indicate that between 25 and 33 percent of all
leavers experience food insecurity (Isaacs & Lyon, 2000; Loprest
& Zedlewski, 1999), so the families in Louisiana do not differ
markedly in this regard from other TANF families.
Time limits are associated with decreased monthly financial
resources. As noted in other research (Pavetti, 2003), the monthly
financial resources of women involuntarily removed from TANF
are significantly less than either voluntary leavers or TANF recipients. Using the monthly financial resources figure as a rough
proxy for actual yearly income, timed off leavers report receiv-
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ing $6,608 yearly, an amount that is 50.3 percent of the poverty
threshold of $13,133 for a parent with two children set by the
U.S. Census Bureau for this time period (U.S. Census Bureau,
1998). Since women who are timed off TANF report the lowest
monthly income and the lowest employment rates, it appears
that being involuntarily removed from welfare leads to increased
economic stress, which is not resolved through greater labor force
participation.
Sanctioned leavers differed significantly from TANF recipients in terms of their ability to access medical resources. In
this regard, they shared with voluntary leavers an inability to
obtain Medicaid, and, likely as a consequence, had difficulty in
obtaining medical care they needed for themselves. Although
Medicaid services were administratively delinked from TANF
receipt (Health Resources Services Administration, 2003), these
results suggest that when TANF benefits are ended, a sizeable
minority of recipients who might be income eligible for Medicaid
no longer receive it.
Although having been a recent victim of domestic violence
did not predict TANF status, differences in the lifetime prevalence of abuse indicate that it may be associated with sanctioning
and time limits. Almost twice as many timed off and sanctioned
leavers report a history of domestic violence compared to voluntary leavers, and almost one third of those still on TANF report
having experienced domestic violence in their lifetimes. These
data suggest that abuse may have a cumulative effect making
women more vulnerable to sanctioning, rather than a strictly
proximal one.
Conclusions
This study provides a glimpse into the experiences of families
receiving TANF in a single state, during the beginning period
of implementation of welfare reform regulations, within a more
stringent policy regime than is the case in many states. Although
these results cannot be generalized to the national level because
of the differences in policy and economic environments among
the states, these results do raise certain cautions. First, while
it is possible to achieve successful caseload reduction through
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the implementation of time limits and sanctions, this does not
necessarily translate into increased economic self-sufficiency on
the part of families who are the targets of these policies. In fact,
families that are timed off the welfare rolls may instead be experiencing even deeper poverty and deprivation.
Second, time limits and sanctions do not appear to be significant motivators for employment. This may in part be related to the
fact that the labor market environment for most welfare recipients
consists of unstable, low-paying, geographically inaccessible positions without benefits that do not significantly improve social
or economic circumstances of these families. Effective services
need to build on the strengths of families and to address the many
structural as well as human capital barriers that hinder them from
achieving financial independence through employment rather
than individualistic attempts to shape complex family outcomes.
TANF policymakers can either view sanctions and time limits
as guides pointing them to the families that are most in need of
supportive interventions, or these strategies can be used as ways
to easily exit challenging clients. If welfare reform is to be truly
labeled a success, it cannot be at the expense of those who are the
most vulnerable and least able to access necessary resources.
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